

being assimilated, they withdrew into the regressive positions of Armenian conservatism.<sup>49</sup>

The same view assumes that the *hocas* were not only closer to the people, but that they attempted to meet at least some of their needs. In so doing, they intended to bring the masses under their sway and leadership, and eventually, to attain their ultimate goal with popular support: the liberation of Armenia. The *hocas* perceived “Turkish military feudalism” as a hindering, obstructive system in which their economic, especially commercial, interests could not be enhanced. This argument goes on to state that to throw off this “formidable yoke,” *hocas* advocated the liberation of the Armenian people and the establishment of “native rule over the native land.”<sup>50</sup> After securing the support of the Armenian masses for their cause for outside help; papal diplomacy and French capital, according to this view, presented the most promising and attractive prospects. As a result, on the one hand *hocas* were trying to convince their clerical allies in the Armenian church to make concessions to the Catholic church in Rome, while on the other a prominent *hoca* was dispatched to Western Europe as emissary to work out plans for the united rebellion of Armenians and Greeks.<sup>51</sup>

In opposition to *hocas*, the *çelebis* are represented as defenders of Ottoman rule and the *status quo*, because their economic interests dictated such a political orientation. As the *çelebis* were bankers, this view claims,

the main field [of operation] of their capital was the environment of the palace and the pashas, and, therefore, their interests were closely linked with the Turkish (i.e. Ottoman) bureaucracy.<sup>52</sup>

The other view, represented mainly by Siruni, refuses to accept not only the existence of the class struggle but of two separate classes. Siruni, who discusses Anasian’s thesis at quite a length, dismisses the assertion of two classes and draws attention to the fact that

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.