Chapter
III
THE
ROLE
OF
AMIRAS
IN
THE
OTTOMAN
STATE
It
is
commonly
asserted
that
amiras
held
managerial
or
supervisory
positions
in
any
state
institutions
and
established
close
connections
with
the
palace,
the
central
administration
and
Turkish
officialdom.
Their
presence
was
strongly
felt
in
two
spheres
of
the
economic
life
of
the
empire:
finance
and
industry.
A
detailed
consideration
of
the
evidence
on
their
infiltration
into
these
spheres
consequently
seems
both
warranted
and
useful.
As
has
been
established,
the
relatively
rich
Armenian
would
enter
into
the
profession
of
sarraf,
the
Ottoman
designation
for
banker
or
money-lender,
after
amassing
a
working
capital
in
Istanbul
or
the
provinces.
The
great
majority
of
amiras
practiced
this
profession.
(See
appendix
for
details.
)
Although
there
were
some
Jewish
and
Greek
sarrafs,
the
privilege
to
practice
the
trade,
sarraflik,
was
granted
with
overwhelming
frequency
to
Armenians.
Western
and
Armenian
contemporary
accounts
lend
support
to
the
assertion
that
the
profession
was
dominated
by
the
Armenians.
[1]
The
nineteenth
century
court-historian,
vak’anüvis
Ahmed
Cevdet,
names
two
prominent
Armenian
sarrafs
and
implies
that
the
others
too
were
predominantly
drawn
from
the
same
ethnic
group.
[2]
However,
any
Ottoman
subject
could
enter
into
the
sarraflik
trade
with
a
small
or
large
capital
after
obtaining
the
necessary
berat,
permission,
paying
a
certain
fee;
he
would
then
join
the
guild
of
the
sarrafs.
Once
the
official
permission
was
granted,
the
sarraf
could
lend
money
to
anybody
according
to
prevailing
laws
and
regulations,
as
well
as
customs,
but
those
wishing
to
enter
into
governmental
transactions
had
to
obtain
a
special
license.
The
sarrafs
licensed
by
the
state
were
kuyruklu,
literally
“with
tail,
”
meaning
privileged
or
licensed.
[3]
These
were
granted
the
permission
to
work
with
the
state
treasury,
and
were,
therefore,
treasury
sarrafs
(hazine
sarraflari).
[4]
These
sarrafs
played
a
pivotal
role
in
the
iltizam
system
of
taxation.
The
main
function
of
the
system
was
to
guarantee
income
to
the
state
treasury
through
the
collection
of
taxes.
At
first
taxes
were
collected
only
from
imperial
lands,
in
Ottoman
terminology
havass-i
hümayan.
[5]
The
system,
however,
grew
from
year
to
year,
and
by
the
eighteenth
century
many
kinds
of
taxes
were
collected
throughout
the
empire.
[6]
Turkish
pashas,
known
as
mültezim,
entered
into
contractual
obligation
with
the
state
treasury,
bidding
for
the
right
to
collect
taxes
in
the
provinces.
This
system
allowed
the
state
treasury
to
acquire
most
of
the
taxes
to
be
collected
long
before
the
tax
collectors
were
in
the
field.
Moreover,
peasants
frequently
paid
in
kind
and
there
was
a
necessary
period
of
waiting
before
this
could
be
translated
into
its
cash
equivalent.
The
right
to
collect
taxes
was
sold
at
auction
and
the
highest
bidder
was
granted
permission
for
the
collection
of
taxes
in
a
province.
To
guarantee
payment
of
the
sum
that
was
bid,
the
state
treasury
required
the
mültezim
to
present
the
security
of
a
sarraf,
for
the
successful
bidder
had
to
deposit
the
amount
agreed
upon
either
immediately
or
in
installments.
To
gain
the
financial
support
of
a
sarraf,
the
mültezim-pasha
needed
“a
note
of
hand
from
his
former
banker,
declaring
that
all
his
demands
had
been
satisfied.
”
[7]
The
sarrafs
took
considerable
risks.
The
government
held
the
Armenian
sarraf,
and
not
the
mültezim,
responsible
for
the
actual
payment
of
the
amounts
involved,
even
when
the
latter
was
wealthy.
In
general,
the
mültezims
had
rank
and
influence
but
they
rarely
controlled
capital
large
enough
to
pay
the
security
demanded
by
the
state
treasury.
Furthermore,
the
state
had
more
trust
in
the
sarraf
than
the
mültezim
who
could
default
in
his
payment
and
avoid
punitive
damages.
The
sarraf
paid
to
the
state
treasury
a
certain
sum,
which
varied
between
1,
500
and
11,
000
kuruş
(piastres),
for
the
berat,
the
official
permission,
needed
to
act
as
guarantor
to
the
mültezim.
Moreover
each
time
payment
of
the
amount
stipulated
in
a
contract
was
completed,
he
had
to
pay
a
fee,
harc,
in
order
to
mark
the
reddiyye-i
temessük,
termination
of
claim.
[8]
The
roster
of
the
licensed
sarrafs
was
kept
in
the
records
of
both
the
hazine-i
maliye,
the
state
treasury,
and
the
hazine-i
hassa,
the
sultan’s
privy
purse.
[9]
This
is
an
indication
of
the
fact
that
both
the
government
and
the
palace
were
interested
in
the
sarrafs.
Though
Armenian
historical
sources
make
no
mention
of
the
fact,
a
modern
Turkish
historian
claims
that
the
profession
of
sarraf
was
hereditary.
[10]
It
is
true
that
there
were
many
families
whose
members
were
sarrafs
–a
quick
look
at
the
roster
of
amiras
will
confirm
this
(see
Appendix)–
but
this
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
the
profession
was
of
hereditary
nature.
Usually
the
sarraf
would
designate
his
own
agent
to
accompany
the
mültezim
pasha
to
the
province
whose
taxes
the
pasha
was
to
collect.
The
agent,
ordinarily
a
relative
of
the
sarraf,
would
watch
very
closely
the
activities
of
the
mültezim.
Apparently,
“all
money
transactions
pass[ed]
through
his
[the
agent’s]
hands.
”
[11]
Where
the
taxes
were
paid
in
kind,
that
is
in
commodities
(which
happened
very
frequently),
the
sarraf
or
his
agent
would
convert
the
agricultural
products
into
cash
by
sale
in
various
municipal
markets,
thus
acting
both
as
banker
and
merchant.
[12]
In
disposing
of
the
commodities
collected
“which
he
managed
to
obtain
at
a
reduced
price,
”
[13]
the
sarraf
was
entitled
to
a
ten
percent
commission
or
“agency”
[14]
in
addition
to
the
interest
on
the
money
loaned.
At
least
one
Western
contemporary
source,
critical
of
sarrafs,
states
that
the
pasha,
after
his
arrival
to
the
province,
would
give
the
banker
a
present
ranging
“from
a
tenth
to
one-fifth
of
the
value
of
the
revenue
as
his
[the
sarraf’s]
profits
on
the
operation
[sale
of
agricultural
products],
and
a[nother]
present
to
his
[the
sarraf’s]
clerk,
of
the
diverse
produce
of
the
province.
”
[15]
Since
the
sarraf
or
his
agent
usually
made
the
sale
of
agricultural
commodities,
the
ten
to
twenty
percent
cited
by
the
contemporary
westerner
was
the
profit
that
the
sarraf
kept
for
himself
from
the
sale
he
made.
Apparently
this
profit
on
the
sale
of
commodities
was
as
much
part
of
the
agreement
between
the
mültezim
and
the
sarraf
as
interest
on
the
money
loaned.
As
to
the
rate
of
interest
on
the
money
the
sarraf
loaned
to
the
mültezim
at
the
time
of
bidding,
it
varied
from
eighteen
to
twenty-four
percent
per
annum.
[16]
These
interest
rates
have
seemed
usurious
to
some
modern
historians
[17]
and
have
been
cited
as
the
reason
for
the
resentment
of
the
bankers
by
the
general
population.
Bankers
are
rarely
loved,
but
it
is
doubtful
if
the
interest
rates
were
the
reason
for
special
resentment
for
sarrafs.
According
to
most
recent
research
these
rates
were
not
inordinately
high.
A
contemporary
Westerner
wrote
that
“un
banquier
juif
nous
disait
qu’entre
confrères
on
se
prêtait
entre
24
et
25
pourcent
d’intérêt.
En
Turquie,
20
pourcent
est
un
terme
moyen
de
prêt.
”
[18]
In
a
recent
study,
an
American
historian,
analyzing
data
pertaining
to
loaning
and
credit
customs
and
mentality
among
the
Turkish
inhabitants
of
the
central
Anatolian
city
of
Kayseri,
adduces:
“legal
and
moral
practice
had
evolved
to
a
point
where
an
interest
rate
of
20
percent
per
year
was
accepted
by
the
entire
[Muslim]
religious
community
in
accordance
with
the
sharia.
”
[19]
Later
he
adds:
“That
it
was
possible
to
charge
20
percent
interest
a
year
without
any
kind
of
deception
is
indisputable,
even
if
the
historical
process
by
which
this
came
about
is
not
clear.
”
[20]
He
then
concludes:
“loans
of
20
percent
interest
were
respectable.
”
[21]
If
the
rates
charged
by
the
sarrafs
were
not
“respectable,
”
in
that
they
could
be
over
20
percent
per
year,
they
were
not
outrageously
high,
unacceptable
and
usurious
either.
Moreover,
if
the
sarrafs
“entre
confrères”
were
making
loans
at
24
and
25
percent
interest
per
year,
then
the
rates
charged
on
loans
given
to
mültezims
were
not
higher
than
the
going
market
rates
for
ordinary
financial
transactions.
Because
of
the
size
of
the
capital
required,
only
very
wealthy
individuals
could
enter
the
profession.
Pertinent
data
are
not
available
to
provide
answers
to
such
questions
as:
how
many
bankers
were
registered
as
treasury
sarrafs?
What
were
the
ranges
of
the
loans
made?
What
method
of
payment
was
more
frequently
used,
lump
sum
or
installment?
The
most
important
element
which
does
remain
is
the
identification
of
the
sarrafs.
Through
such
an
identification
it
may
be
possible
to
establish
a
correlation
between
the
hazine
sarrafs
and
the
amira
sarrafs
(for,
as
we
have
established
earlier,
not
all
sarrafs
were
called
amira).
The
financial
support
that
sarrafs
provided
was
vital
in
other,
related
fields
of
Ottoman
government.
Turkish
officials
who
aspired
to
high
political
office
needed
money
at
every
stage,
as
politicians
appointed
or
elected
to
office
have
always
done.
Not
only
were
the
posts
of
government
purchased,
but
also
the
visible
symbols
of
power
and
their
accoutrements
were
expensive.
After
his
appointment
to
an
office,
the
first
thing
a
new
pasha
did
was
to
find
an
Armenian
sarraf
to
finance
the
purchase
of
“his
outfit
of
daggers,
pistols,
shawls,
and
all
the
other
indispensables
of
a
pasha.
”
[22]
The
sarrafs
enjoyed
such
“unlimited
confidence”
that
they
were
“never
asked
for
an
account...
even
for
an
acknowledgment
of
the
money
which
passed
through
their
hands.
”
[23]
The
close
working
relationship
between
the
Turkish
pasha
and
the
Armenian
sarraf
would
create
friendship
and
trust
in
each
other.
This
relationship
was
based
mainly
on
mutual
interest;
more
often
than
not,
it
turned
into
enduring,
lifelong
loyalty
and
friendship.
There
are
many
eyewitness
accounts
and
much
factual
evidence
to
support
such
a
view
of
the
sarraf’s
relations
with
the
mültezim.
An
early
nineteenth
century
Armenian
chronicler
recorded:
“In
these
days
(in
1809)
the
one-eyed
Yusuf
Pasha
came
to
Sebastia
on
his
way
to
Constantinople
[where
he
was
appointed]
Grand
Vezir.
Along
with
him
came
his
sarraf
mahdesi
Kasbar
Amira
of
Mashkert.
”
[24]
Another
illustration
of
the
personal
ties
between
a
Turkish
pasha
and
an
Armenian
sarraf
is
the
friendship
between
Çiblak
Hüseyin
Pasha
and
Dakes
Amira.
The
latter
helped
Hüseyin
Pasha
financially
when
he
was
removed
from
office
by
Sultan
Selim
III
(1788-1807).
In
recompense
when
the
pasha
was
appointed
Grand
Vezir
later
on,
he
not
only
kept
Dakes
Amira
as
his
official
sarraf
but
secretly
brought
his
family
from
Akn
to
Istanbul
to
surprise
him.
[25]
The
fortunes
of
the
Armenian
sarraf
consequently
rose
and
fell
with
those
of
his
pasha.
The
sarraf
had
much
to
gain
from
the
elevation
of
his
pasha,
and
to
that
end
he
would
“even
contribute
to
[the
pasha’s]
nomination
to
be
Grand
Vezir.
”
[26]
Along
with
its
advantages,
such
a
relationship
naturally
had
its
pitfalls,
as
we
shall
see
later
in
this
chapter.
As
the
iltizam
tax-farming
system
grew
both
in
terms
of
the
kinds
of
taxes
collected
and
the
areas
under
the
system’s
jurisdiction,
the
sarrafs
took
on
a
more
important
and
greater
role.
The
state
was
actually
“borrowing
from
the
sarrafs,
”
[27]
using
taxes
that
were
to
be
collected
as
collateral.
The
immediate
and
major
concern
of
the
state
was
the
availability
of
cash
provided
by
the
loans.
Thus,
financing
the
daily
operations
of
the
Ottoman
Empire
became
a
tripartite
affair,
bringing
the
sarrafs
into
ever
more
direct
contact
with
the
Ottoman
state
itself.
Under
the
iltizam
system
it
was
invariably
the
mültezim
who
collected
taxes
in
the
provinces
as
representatives
of
the
government,
but
Armenian
sarrafs
were
given
full
and
direct
responsibility
in
the
collection
of
customs
duties.
While
it
is
not
clear
why
the
sarrafs
could
collect
duties
but
not
taxes,
a
partial
explanation
of
this
phenomenon
may
lie
in
the
fact
that
the
collection
of
duties
by
Armenian
sarrafs
was
limited
to
major
ports
such
as
Istanbul,
Izmir,
and
such
major
commercial
centers
as
Aleppo
and
Erzurum.
To
cite
but
two
instances:
in
1802
Hovhannes
Çelebi
Diuzian
had
acquired
the
right
to
collect
customs
duties
on
silk,
[28]
and
in
1847,
a
company
headed
by
Mgrditch
Amira
Djezayirlian
and
Maksud
Amira
Sarimian
was
granted
permission
to
collect
import
duties
at
ports
in
Istanbul
and
Izmir.
[29]
Other
sarrafs
were
jewelers
and
goldsmiths.
In
this
capacity
they
served
the
palace,
providing
members
of
the
sultan’s
family
with
jewelry.
The
kuyumcu,
i.
e.
“goldsmith,
”
sarraf
had
to
have
the
capital
as
well
as
the
knowledge
necessary
for
the
profession.
According
to
a
Turkish
historian,
the
kuyumcubaşi,
chief
goldsmith,
and
all
the
goldsmith
sarrafs
were
Armenian.
[30]
Most
of
these
sarrafs
had
goldsmiths
work
for
them.
In
some
provinces,
goldsmithing
was
a
special
trade
with
hundreds
of
years
of
tradition
and
many
professional
secrets.
A
case
in
point
is
goldsmithing
in
the
city
and
province
of
Van.
According
to
one
source,
the
profession
had
seven
subdivisions,
each
with
its
specific
task.
[31]
Much
the
same
was
true
in
Divrig,
a
town
near
Sebastia,
where
goldsmithing
among
Armenians
was
a
highly
developed
and
specialized
craft.
The
specialty
of
the
trade
in
Divrig
lay
in
the
secret
formula
of
mixing
gold
with
an
alloy
without
leaving
any
impression
of
impurity
or
admixture.
This
apparently
improved
the
quality
of
the
gold
without
degrading
it
in
value
or
in
appearance.
Those
who
knew
the
secret
formula
were
called
küliçeci,
[32]
a
slang
word
meaning
mixer
or
caster.
[33]
In
Istanbul,
these
skilled
goldsmiths
worked
as
craftsmen
and
sometimes
as
sarrafs.
[34]
Among
the
Armenian
sarrafs
who
began
as
skilled
artisans,
no
position
was
of
great
or
even
equal
importance
for
the
function
and
financial
well-being
of
the
Ottoman
state
than
the
management
of
operation
of
the
state
mint.
In
order
to
evaluate
the
function
and
role
of
these
Armenian
sarrafs
more
effectively,
a
concise
description
of
the
organizational
structure
of
the
mint
seems
warranted.
Like
the
other
revenue-producing
enterprises,
the
income
of
the
mint
was
farmed
out
at
auction.
As
in
the
case
of
provinces,
here
too
the
successful
contractor,
called
'
amil,
had
to
make
payments
to
the
state
treasury
in
one
lump
sum
or
in
regular
installments.
[35]
Although
the
'
amil,
the
intendent
of
finance
or
collector
of
revenues,
[36]
was
responsible
for
the
collection
of
income,
the
actual
operation
of
the
mint
remained
under
the
control
of
state-appointed
employees.
These
consisted
of
the
emin
or
nazir,
who
was
responsible
for
the
supervision
of
the
mint;
the
sahib-i
’
ayar,
who
saw
to
it
that
all
technical
and
legal
requirements
were
met,
and
who
acted
as
the
director
of
operations;
and
the
ustad
or
usta,
who
managed
the
minting
process.
[37]
All
appointive
positions
were
entrusted
to
Armenians,
who
thus
held
the
operational
and
managerial
control
of
the
mint.
In
the
earlier
period
the
mint
had
been
controlled
by
Jewish
directors.
Available
sources
provide
only
fragmentary
information
on
how
and
why
the
control
passed
into
the
hands
of
Armenians.
In
1752
a
Dzeron
Amira
(no
family
name
is
given),
who
was
a
sarraf
of
the
mint,
died
and
a
Catholic
Armenian,
Petraki
Çelebi,
succeeded
him.
[38]
Then,
in
1758,
Mikayel
Çelebi
Diuzian
or
Diuz
(Düz
in
Turkish)
was
appointed
director
of
the
mint,
and
Yago
Bonfil,
the
Jewish
director
was
removed
from
office.
[39]
Apparently
Mikayel
Çelebi
supported
the
vezir
who
emerges
as
the
winner
in
the
internal
rivalry
around
the
palace.
[40]
After
1758,
the
position
of
Director
of
the
Imperial
Mint
was
held
with
a
short
interruption
by
a
member
of
the
Diuzian
family
until
1880.
The
ascent
of
the
family
is
significant.
It
is
reported
that
a
Harutiun
Diuzian
emigrated
from
Divrig,
a
center
of
goldsmithing,
to
Istanbul
where
he
worked
as
a
goldsmith.
The
circumstances
surrounding
the
appointment
of
Sarkis
Diuzian
(d.
1721),
a
descendant
of
Harutiun,
as
palace
goldsmith,
are
not
clear.
What
is
known
is
the
fact
that
Sarkis
was
very
skilled
in
his
profession.
His
descendants
continued
to
serve
the
palace
in
the
same
capacity,
becoming
kuyumcubaşi,
chief
goldsmith
in
the
interim
until
Mikayel
got
the
appointment
to
the
mint.
Thus
Mikayel
was
able
to
combine
in
his
person
two
positions:
kuyumcubaşi
and
darphane
emini,
chief
goldsmith
and
director
of
the
mint.
Both
positions
were
kept
in
the
family
on
a
hereditary
basis,
either
in
one
person
or
among
different
members.
By
this
time
the
mint
contained
a
special
plant
where
the
Armenian
goldsmiths
worked
on
gold
and
silver.
[41]
In
1819,
the
family
was
disgraced,
four
of
its
male
members
hanged
and
the
others
driven
to
exile,
and
the
control
of
the
mint
was
entrusted
to
Harutiun
Amira
Bezdjian,
who
was,
however,
a
former
employee
and
protégé
of
the
Diuzians.
From
1819
to
1832
Bezdjian
kept
the
directorship
of
the
mint,
except
for
a
short
interval
in
1820,
when
he
too
was
exiled
for
a
year.
During
that
period
still
another
Armenian
sarraf,
Boghos
Bilezigdjian,
was
put
in
charge
of
the
institution.
[42]
In
addition
to
the
money
they
made
in
goldsmithing
and
at
the
mint,
the
Diuzians
were
involved
in
banking
activities
as
well.
In
1802
Hovhannes
Çelebi
Diuzian
obtained
the
right
to
collect
customs
duties
on
silk.
[43]
Another
member
of
the
family,
Hagop
Çelebi,
showed
interest
in
industry
and
built
a
large
paper
mill
in
Izmir
in
the
1840s.
[44]
The
Diuzians
brought
improvements
in
the
management
and
efficiency
in
the
operation
of
the
mint.
Mikayel
is
reported
to
have
invented
a
new
method
to
polish
gold,
a
closely
guarded
secret,
used
only
in
the
mint
until
1830,
when
apparently
the
secret
was
given
out.
Mikayel
minted
a
new
gold
coin,
called
findik
altini,
literally
“hazel
nut
gold.
”
The
first
to
take
steps
to
modernize
the
operation
of
the
mint
was
Hagop
Çelebi
Diuzian
who,
in
1843,
imported
from
England
steam-powered
engines
to
cut
gold
and
silver
coins.
The
following
year
the
new
coins
known
as
mecidiye
were
introduced
to
the
public.
[45]
His
successor
and
relative
Mihran
Çelebi
Diuzian
continued
the
modernization
process.
According
to
Süleyman
Sudi
Efendi,
who
was
familiar
with
its
operations,
the
founders
of
the
modernized
mint
were
Hagop
and
Mihran
Diuzian
or
Düzoģlu,
as
the
family
was
known
in
governmental
circles.
[46]
The
mint
had
always
had
Armenian
employees.
The
renowned
traveler
Evliya
Çelebi
had
recorded
that
the
die-casters
were
“Christians
and
very
honest,
”
the
smelters
(or
refiners)
were
Jews.
[47]
After
the
mint
came
under
Diuzians’
control
the
number
of
its
Armenian
employees
increased.
[48]
High
level
personnel,
especially
those
with
technical
skills,
were
Armenian,
and
there
are
many
references
to
Armenians
holding
technical
positions
at
the
mint.
[49]
Indeed,
the
complete
control
of
the
operation
of
the
mint
by
the
Armenian
director
and
his
immediate
subordinates
is
reflected
by
the
fact
that
the
records
of
the
mint
were
kept
in
Turkish
written
in
Armenian
characters
that
only
Armenians
could
read.
[50]
These
records
of
the
mint
were
only
recently
discovered,
after
some
bales
had
been
burned
as
waste
paper.
[51]
While
the
employees
received
lifetime
appointments
from
the
government,
the
collector
of
revenues
held
his
position
on
a
yearly
basis,
with
the
possibility
of
reappointment.
[52]
The
directors
of
the
mint
apparently
were
not
simply
salaried
employees.
They
could
derive
financial
benefits
from
their
singular
position.
For
instance,
Harutiun
Amira
Bezdjian
devised
an
astutely
profitable
system:
he
knew
that
the
Muslims
in
India
cherished
the
gold
coin
known
as
rubiye
and
would
buy
this
coin,
valued
at
20
kuruş,
for
25
kuruş,
as
a
valuable
coin
from
Dar
ül-Hilafet,
the
Abode
of
the
Caliphate.
Consequently,
Bezdjian
collected
from
the
market
as
many
of
the
coins
as
possible
and
sent
them
to
India
to
be
sold
there
at
a
25
percent
profit.
[53]
The
Armenian
sarrafs,
whether
lending
funds
to
mültezim
pashas,
working
for
the
mint,
or
making
loans
to
ordinary
borrowers,
had
their
own
organization:
a
guild,
with
a
kehya
or
kâyha,
“chief”
or
“steward”
of
the
guild.
[54]
Armenian
sources
refer
to
various
individuals
as
sarraflar
kehyasi,
chief
of
the
guild
of
sarrafs.
In
1728
Markar
Amira,
[55]
in
the
1780s
Harutiun
Amira
Balkapantsi,
[56]
in
the
1790s
Minas
Amira
Tcheraz,
[57]
in
1819
Garabed
Amira
Aznavurian,
[58]
held
the
position.
No
listing
of
the
membership
of
this
guild
at
any
given
time
is
available,
unfortunately,
at
least
at
this
point,
although
a
Western
source
stated
that
the
sarrafs’
“corporation
consist[ed]
of
sixty
or
eighty
members,
”
corresponding
to
the
number
of
pashaliks.
[59]
The
promulgation
of
the
Hatt-i
Şerif
of
Gülhane,
the
“Noble
Rescript
of
the
Rose
Chamber,
”
on
3
November
1839,
which
abolished
the
iltizam
tax-farming
system
in
order
to
end
the
abuses
associated
with
it,
[60]
was
the
first
blow
to
the
flourishing
business
of
the
sarrafs.
This
measure
was
further
strengthened
by
the
new
imperial
rescript,
Hatt-i
Hümayun,
of
March
1840,
which
reorganized
the
provincial
administration
of
the
empire,
first
by
centralizing
it
and
then
by
bringing
it
into
an
orderly
system
with
salaried
officials,
who
were
to
replace
pashas
and
were
responsible,
to
the
central
authorities.
[61]
Due
to
the
strong
reaction
against
these
reform
measures,
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
financial
difficulties
that
were
encountered
during
the
ensuing
short
period,
on
the
other
hand,
the
new
tax
system
was
abandoned
in
February
1842
and
the
civilian
tax
collecting
officials
were
replaced
by
“the
military
governors
and
their
contractors,
with
the
assistance
of
councils
of
local
notables.
”
[62]
This
relatively
new
situation
apparently
ushered
in
a
new
role
for
the
Armenian
sarrafs.
In
1842,
an
association
called
Anadolu
ve
Rumeli
Kumpanyasi,
the
“Anatolia
and
Rumeli
Company,
”
came
into
existence
with
governmental
sanction.
This
company
or
association
was
responsible
for
the
collection
and
remittance
of
the
revenues
of
the
whole
empire
to
the
treasury.
Armenian
sources
do
not
describe
specifically
how
it
functioned
and
collected
taxes.
We
know,
however,
that
the
company
had
two
divisions:
one
for
Anatolia,
and
one
for
Rumeli,
and
each
division
had
six
Armenian
sarrafs.
The
Anatolian
division
consisted
of
the
following:
Harutiun
Amira
Erganian
(Yerganian
or
Uzunian),
Mgrditch
Amira
Djezayirlian,
Bedros
Amira
Kiurkdjikhanlian,
Misak
Amira
Misakian,
Baghdasar
Amira
Tcharazian
(Tcherazian
or
Tcheraz)
and
Boghos
Amira
Ashnanian.
The
Rumeli
division
had
the
following
membership:
Djanig
Amira
Papazian
(or
Simonian),
Maksud
Amira
Sarimian,
Harutiun
Amira
Gelgelian,
Apraham
Allahverdian
(or
Allahverdi),
Hovhannes
Tengerian
(or
Tenger),
Hovsep
Davidian.
[63]
Except
for
the
last
three,
who
were
Catholics,
the
others
were
Apostolic
Armenian
amiras.
The
company,
headed
by
Harutiun
Amira
Erganian,
proved
to
be
a
short-lived
experience:
due
to
irregularities,
strong
European
competition
and
lack
of
efficient
organization,
it
was
eventually
dissolved.
[64]
It
was
this
European
competition
that
brought
the
eventual
doom
of
the
sarrafs.
But
they
made
a
last
attempt
to
maintain
their
control
before
their
total
eclipse.
By
the
imperial
edict
of
23
March
1853,
a
bank
was
to
be
established
with
a
capital
of
350
million
kurus.
Ottoman
citizens
could
buy
the
shares
valued
at
100
sterling
pounds
each.
The
Egyptian
yearly
tribute
was
pledged
as
collateral.
The
shares,
actually
bonds,
were
to
mature
in
15
years.
Mihran
Çelebi
Diuzian
was
to
be
named
director
of
the
bank,
assisted
by
a
board
of
governors
with
twelve
members.
The
board
included
the
following
sarrafs:
Maksud
Amira
Sarimian,
Apraham
Allahverdian,
Hovhannes
Tengerian,
Boghos
Çelebi
Diuzian,
Diran
Aleksanian,
Charles
Hanson,
David
Glavani,
Yanni
Psikhari,
Zarifi,
etc.
[65]
It
is
significant
that
only
one
sarraf
of
amira
rank
was
a
member
of
this
board.
Whether
the
amira-sarrafs
themselves
desisted
or
were
not
invited
to
join
the
board,
the
presently
available
sources
unfortunately
shed
no
light
on
this
question.
The
Crimean
war
put
an
effective
end
not
only
to
this
project,
but
to
the
profession
of
the
sarrafs.
After
the
war
the
Ottoman
state
resorted,
rather
unwillingly,
to
loans
from
European
lending
institutions.
It
was
neither
the
1839
Hatt-i
Şerif
of
Gülhane,
nor
the
Hatt-i
Hümayun,
the
“Imperial
Rescript,
”
promulgated
on
February
1856,
that
brought
the
final
demise
of
the
sarrafs,
as
has
been
claimed
by
one
student
of
the
topic,
[66]
but
European
banks
and
their
representatives,
actively
supported
by
their
respective
governments.
[67]
As
the
Diuzians
were
masters
of
the
mint,
so
the
Dadians,
another
family
of
amiras,
held
the
monopoly
for
the
operation
of
the
gunpowder
mills
in
Istanbul.
Dad
Arakel
Amira,
the
ancestor
who
gave
the
family
its
name,
was
appointed
barutcubaşi,
“chief
powder
maker,
”
in
1795,
by
Sultan
Selim
III
in
appreciation
for
his
mechanical
skills
and
technical
innovations.
Having
migrated
earlier
from
Akn
to
Istanbul
and
tried
his
luck
as
a
watch
repairer,
Dad
Arakel
then
turned
sarraf
but
had
to
abandon
this
profession
as
well
because
of
a
long
illness.
Finally,
he
entered
into
the
employ
of
a
flour
milling
company,
named
“Paydos.
”
Upon
the
recommendation
of
Foreign
Minister
Reşid
Efendi
(whom
he
had
known
and
impressed
when
working
as
a
watch
repairer),
he
was
allowed
to
repair
the
pulley
of
the
old
gunpowder
mill
at
Ay
Stefano
(known
also
as
San
Stefano,
now
Yeşil
Köy).
This
activity
brought
him
to
the
attention
of
Ottoman
officials,
who
asked
him
to
build
a
steampowered
engine
for
the
new
powder
factory
under
construction
at
Azadli,
a
village
north
of
Kücük
Çekmece.
Having
successfully
completed
the
task
assigned,
Dad
Arakel
was
then
appointed
director
of
the
new
powder
mill,
with
the
privilege
of
exemption
from
payment
of
taxes
and
import
duties.
[68]
Arakel
Amira
further
invented
a
new
machine
that
could
perform
four
operations
at
once:
it
could
crush
the
mass
of
powder,
mince
and
sift
it,
and
pulverize
and
sift
the
coal.
As
the
quality
of
the
powder
manufactured
at
the
Azadli
mill
proved
superior
to
the
one
made
at
the
old
mill,
the
French
technician,
who
had
been
managing
the
mill
at
Ay
Stefano,
was
dismissed
and
Arakel
was
appointed
director.
“A
selfmade
mechanical
genius,
”
[69]
Dad
Arakel
invented
several
other
machines
or
devices.
Thus
he
built
a
wheeled-boat,
similar
to
those
on
steamboats
which
did
not
exist
at
the
time.
At
the
request
of
Kapudan
(Admiral)
Hüseyin
Pasha
he
invented,
in
1802,
a
device
to
drain
the
bottom
of
ships,
and
another
machine
to
cover
the
bottom
of
ships
with
copper
instead
of
wood.
In
1805
he
built
five
looms
to
weave
çuha,
broad-cloth;
the
quality
of
the
manufactured
cloth
was
so
high
that
the
Sultan
wore
a
coat
made
of
that
çuha
and
visited
Arakel
Amira
at
his
factory
at
Azadli
to
express
his
satisfaction.
During
Mahmud
II’s
period,
Arakel
also
built
a
machine,
called
hadde,
to
laminate
silver
and
gold
ingots,
which
his
son
Simon
further
improved;
it
was
later
used
in
the
mint
by
the
Diuzians.
[70]
So
great
was
Arakel’s
reputation
that
in
1810
the
Shah
of
Iran
invited
him
to
his
court.
Understandably
Mahmud
did
not
allow
Arakel
to
accept
the
invitation
but
permitted
the
Shah’s
representatives
to
examine
his
machines.
Armenian
sources
state
that
the
position
of
barutcubaşi
was
granted
to
Arakel
Amira
as
a
hereditary
privilege.
[71]
After
Arakel’s
death
in
1812
his
eldest
son,
Simon
Amira
Dadian,
inherited
the
position
at
both
mills.
Whether
the
position
was
hereditary
or
whether
each
sultan
reappointed
the
Dadians,
the
fact
remains
that
this
family
kept
the
management
of
the
two
powder
factories
under
its
control
until
1889.
Most
members
of
the
family
were
highly
gifted,
but
the
outstanding
figure
among
Dad
Arakel’s
successors
is
his
third
son,
Hovhannes
Amira
Dadian
(1798-1869).
It
is
worth
examining
and
studying
the
work
of
this
remarkable
man.
His
experience
at
the
mill
started
when
he
was
hardly
fifteen
years
old.
In
1820
he
was
named
director
of
the
paper
mill
at
Beykoz
(founded
by
an
Armenian
named
Artin).
In
1826
he
served
as
director
of
the
spinning
mill
at
Eyyup.
A
year
later
Hovhannes
Amira
devised
a
new
machine
for
the
piercing
and
rifling
of
the
barrels
of
muskets,
and
then
a
device
to
polish
them.
Mahmud
II
was
so
pleased
with
Hovhannes
and
his
older
brother
Simon
that
he
personally
expressed
his
satisfaction
and
gave
Simon
15,
000
and
Hovhannes
10,
000
kuruş.
[72]
The
following
year
Hovhannes
built
three
more
machines
for
the
manufacture
of
muskets
at
the
plant
at
Dolmabahce,
four
others
for
spinning,
and
a
little
later
a
water
pump.
[73]
In
order
to
improve
his
technical
knowledge,
Hovhannes
Amira
made
extensive
trips
to
Europe.
His
first
voyage,
in
1835,
was
overland
to
Austria,
Italy,
France
and
England.
There
he
showed
particular
interest
in
chemistry,
and
gained
up-to-date
knowledge
on
iron
foundries
and
weaving
factories.
As
the
official
representative
of
the
Sultan,
he
was
well
received
everywhere
he
visited.
[74]
At
the
end
of
this
yearlong
trip,
he
brought
with
him
modern
machinery
for
the
powder
mills
whose
operation
he
reorganized
completely.
He
had
also
obtained
many
diplomas
from
various
institutions,
and
was
consequently
granted
the
important
medal
of
iftihar
in
1838.
The
first
innovations
introduced
by
Hovhannes
Dadian
were
related
chiefly
to
the
two
gunpowder
mills.
Not
only
the
quality
of
the
powder
was
upgraded,
[75]
but
new
methods
of
manufacture
initiated;
[76]
all
of
these
duly
recognized
and
appreciated
by
the
Ottoman
government.
The
most
significant
contributions
this
talented
man
made
to
the
Ottoman
economy
went
beyond
this
sphere,
however,
and
affected
the
whole
of
the
industrial
field.
He
founded
many
state-owned
industrial
plants
and
factories,
a
quick
enumeration
of
which
can
give
a
sense
of
the
range
of
his
work
and
of
his
multifaceted
talent.
In
1840
he
set
up
a
silk
mill
for
the
manufacture
of
silk
products
at
Hereke;
during
the
same
year
an
iron
smelting
foundry
was
established
at
Ay
Stefano,
near
the
powder
mill;
in
1842,
a
tannery
was
built
at
a
place
called
Boģazici
or
Silviburnu,
near
Beykoz,
whose
leather
was
to
be
used
for
the
manufacture
of
shoes
and
powderflasks
for
the
troops;
in
1844
two
factories
were
erected
at
Izmir
for
the
manufacture
of
çuha,
broadcloth,
to
be
utilized
in
making
clothing
for
soldiers;
in
1845
a
cotton
mill
was
constructed
again
at
Hereke,
for
the
manufacture
of
fes,
headgear,
underwear,
socks,
carpet
and
silk
cloth;
during
the
same
year
one
large
and
one
small
iron
melting
foundries
were
built
at
Zeytinburnu;
near
Ay
Stefano.
Most
of
these
factories
needed
modern,
European-made
machinery,
for
the
purchase
of
which
Hovhannes
Amira
undertook
his
second
year-long
trip
to
Europe
(from
October
1842
to
February
1844).
Along
with
the
purchased
machinery
he
hired
European
technicians
and
skilled
workers
to
operate
the
modern
factories.
Contemporary
sources
continually
refer
to
Sultan
Abdülmecid’s
frequent
visits
to
these
plants.
Indeed,
Hovhannes
Amira
is
reported
to
have
paid
a
visit
to
King
Louis-Philippe
of
France
during
this
second
trip,
thus
lending
support
to
the
view
that
his
visits
were
of
official
nature.
[77]
For
the
same
reason,
in
February
1847,
he
embarked
on
a
third
trip
to
Europe
from
which
he
returned
in
January
1848.
The
contemporary
Armenian
newspaper
in
Izmir
reported
that,
before
the
start
of
his
journey,
Hovhannes
Amira,
along
with
his
two
sons
Arakel-Sisag
and
Nerses-Khosrov
“had
the
honor
to
be
presented
to
Sultan
Abdülmecid
who
had
a
long
conversation
with
Hovhannes
Amira
about
matters
related
to
his
position.
”
[78]
Clearly,
Hovhannes
Amira
acted
in
a
broader
capacity
than
that
of
a
purchasing
agent
for
the
Ottoman
government.
Before
his
second
trip
to
Europe,
he
had
selected
sites
for
factories
to
be
built
in
Bursa
and
Izmit
(then
called
also
Nicomedia).
He
initiated,
planned
and
implemented
the
industrial
projects
that
the
government
felt
the
state
economy
needed.
The
government
determined
the
policy
of
the
industrialization
program,
its
direction,
emphasis
and
the
amount
of
investment;
Dadian’s
task
was
to
implement
the
program,
in
all
its
aspects.
Recently,
a
keen
observer
of
early
Ottoman
industrialization
efforts
remarked:
“Sultan
Abdülmecid
apparently
gave
extensive
authority
to
Ohannes
Dadian
as
effective
head
of
the
new
industrial
program.
In
1842
Ohannes
helped
select
specific
sites
for
the
Istanbul
factories,
the
model
farm,
the
Izmit
wool
mill,
the
Bursa
sheep-ranch...
”
[79]
By
the
early
1840s,
Hovhannes
Amira
was
considered
“probably
more
experienced
in
industrial
management
than
was
any
other
Ottoman
subject.
”
[80]
The
administration
and
management
of
all
these
industrial
enterprises
were
exclusively
in
the
hands
of
Dadians.
While
Hovhannes
was
absorbed
in
the
technical
aspects
of
the
industrial
program,
his
nephew,
Boghos
Amira
(Hovhannes’s
elder
brother,
Simon’s
son),
was
the
supervisor
of
both
powder
mills.
Hovhannes
Amira
took
responsibility
for
governmental
relations,
foreign
and
domestic,
and
for
importation
of
machinery,
his
nephew
acted
as
chief
administrator.
Other
members
of
the
family
were
entrusted
with
key
positions
in
the
factories.
Hovhannes
Amira’s
eldest
son,
Arakel-Sisag,
was
the
manager
of
the
imperial
model
farm
at
Zeytinburnu,
set
up
in
1847.
In
1857
this
young
Dadian
was
named
barutcubaşi
of
the
powderworks
at
Rados
(Rhodes?),
as
well
as
director
of
the
sulphur
and
saltpeter
(or
potassium
nitrate)
factory.
After
his
father’s
death
in
1869,
he
was
appointed
barutcubaşi
of
the
powder
mill
at
Azadli.
[81]
Hovhannes
Amira’s
second
son,
Nerses-Khosrov,
an
engineer
like
his
older
brother,
was
named
director
of
the
wool
mill
at
Izmit
after
his
return
from
studies
in
Paris
in
1845,
and
two
years
later
became
manager
of
the
foundry
at
Zeytinburnu.
Following
in
his
father’s
footsteps,
this
talented
man
was
an
innovator
and,
to
some
extent,
also
an
inventor.
In
1847
he
built
the
first
railroad
track
in
Turkey
on
the
Straits
of
the
Bosphorus.
[82]
This
short
track
was
built
to
facilitate
movement
of
freight
to
and
from
the
brick
factory
at
the
village
of
Böyükdere
on
the
Bosphorus.
He
further
invented
a
water
pump
used
in
the
wells
of
Istanbul,
and
adapted
a
heavy
scale
for
the
use
of
customs
officials
in
the
weighing
of
heavy
loads
in
the
harbor.
Other
members
and
relatives
of
the
family
were
employed
in
the
various
factories
and
plants
under
Dadians’
management.
In
1843
Arakel-Sisag
dispatched
one
of
his
assistants
at
the
Azadli
mill
to
Baghdad
to
set
up
a
powder
mill
there.
The
Dadians
employed
many
Armenians.
The
village
of
Makrikeui,
now
Bakirköy,
was
inhabited
by
immigrant
Armenians
from
various
provinces,
who
worked
in
the
nearby
powder
factory
at
Ay
Stefano.
[83]
Some
of
these
were
skilled
laborers;
Sivri
Khatchadur
Kehya
and
Usda
Ghugas
of
Palu
were
both
experts
in
mechanics
and
powder
making.
[84]
According
to
an
eyewitness
account,
some
five
hundred
Armenian
workers
were
also
employed
at
the
musket
works
at
Fanal,
called
Tophane.
[85]
Many
of
the
factories
and
plants
the
Dadians
managed
were
built
by
Garabed
Amira
Balian,
Chief
Imperial
Architect,
in
cooperation
with
Hovhannes
Amira
Serverian,
another
Imperial
Architect
and
a
son-in-law
of
Garabed
Amira.
To
cite
a
few
instances,
the
tannery
near
Beykoz
was
constructed
by
Balian
Amira
in
1842;
[86]
so
was
the
cuha
mill
in
Izmit,
built
in
1844.
Balian
Amira
reportedly
used
modern
techniques,
for
“the
building
[of
the
cuha
mill]
which
incorporated
significant
advances
in
European
construction
techniques.
”
[87]
In
general,
the
Dadians
kept
a
monopolistic
privilege
and
control
over
the
industrial
field,
the
Balians
and
Serverians
being
involved
only
in
the
construction
of
factories.
The
only
exception
to
this
control
was
Hagop
Celebi
Diuzian
who,
in
1844,
installed
steam-powered
stamping
machines
in
the
mint,
and
built
a
paper
mill
in
Izmir.
It
is
not
known
why
he
did
not
continue
his
activities
in
this
area
of
development.
Were
the
Dadians
able
to
eliminate
their
potential
rival
through
the
intervention
of
the
Sultan
or
the
government?
Did
Hagop
Diuzian
lose
interest
in
industrial
ventures?
The
two
families
had
a
long-standing
rivalry;
whether
this
rivalry
played
any
role
in
cutting
short
Hagop
Diuzian’s
new
career
in
industry
remains
to
be
answered.
In
1849
the
Dadians
were
reported
by
an
English
newspaper
to
have
been
removed
from
office
and
their
properties
confiscated.
[88]
Except
for
this
one
journalistic
account,
however,
no
Armenian
or
Western
source
mentions
such
a
major
mishap
to
the
family.
Foreigners
also
accused
the
Dadians
of
practicing
“Jobbery,
”
a
term
implying
collusion
between
this
Armenian
family
and
Ottoman
officials
to
whom
they
were
accountable.
Apparently
there
was
sufficient
ground
for
the
accusation.
[89]
However,
such
blames
were
not
devoid
of
bias
and
self-serving
interest.
Other
Armenian
industrialists
emerged
eventually,
but
the
industrial
activities
of
Armenians
per
se
is
not
part
of
the
subject
of
this
study,
only
that
of
amiras.
Nor
is
the
industrialization
effort
of
the
Ottoman
state
a
focal
point.
It
should
be
emphasized,
however,
that
if
the
industrial
program
of
the
government
did
not
achieve
the
anticipated
results,
it
was
due
to
the
over-ambitious
goals
it
had
set,
ignoring
such
essential
prerequisites
as
proper
economic
infrastructure
and
social
environment.
A
whole
series
of
accidental
mishaps,
natural
and
man-made,
coincided
to
give
a
heavy
blow
to
the
program.
[90]
The
Ottoman
industrial
program
of
the
1840s
did
not
accomplish
its
major
goals.
“Not
even
Ottoman
military
self-sufficiency
was
remotely
approached.
”
[91]
Many
factories
were
closed
and
equipment
rusted.
Hovhannes
Amira
could
not
“carry
through
[the]
widespread
revolutionary
changes”
that
the
program
would
inevitably
usher
in.
[92]
But
in
a
country
where
one
of
the
major
factors
responsible
for
the
stagnant
condition
of
the
economy
“was
the
lack
of
managers
and
technicians”
[93]
the
Dadians
were
certainly
a
new
breed,
embodying
in
their
persons
both
qualifications.
They
even
tried
to
train
local
people
for
the
new
industries.
In
the
technical
school
they
established,
members
of
the
family
also
served
as
teachers.
All
in
all,
the
Dadians
were
not
merely
industrial
managers
and
technocrats,
both
badly
needed
in
the
Ottoman
industrialization
program,
but
also
innovators
and
westernizers
who
introduced
western
technology,
scientific
innovations,
education
and
mentality
into
Ottoman
governing
circles
and
society
in
general.
Just
as
the
Diuzians
and
the
Dadians
controlled
some
positions,
so
the
Balian
family
came
to
monopolize
the
position
of
Chief
Imperial
Architect,
which
had
formerly
belonged
to
the
Greeks.
[94]
The
early
history
of
the
Balian
family
is
at
present
unclear.
According
to
an
Armenian
source,
an
ancestor
of
the
family,
Bali,
had
entered
into
Sultan
Mehmed
III’s
(1596-1603)
service,
and
married
the
daughter
of
the
royal
architect,
who
was
likewise
an
Armenian.
This
Bali
presumably
inherited
his
father-in-law’s
office
after
the
latter’s
death,
and
Bali’s
position
was
then
given
to
his
son.
The
accession
and
early
succession
to
this
position,
however,
still
remain
contradictory
and
unresolved.
[95]
The
first
fully
documented
Armenian
to
hold
that
office
did
not
belong
to
these
families
but
was
a
certain
Melidon
Arabian
or
Araboģlu,
originally
from
Kesaria
(Kayseri
in
Turkish,
formerly
Caesaria).
He
is
reported
to
have
been
Sultan
Ahmed
III’s
(1703-1730)
architect
in
1722.
During
this
same
period,
a
member
of
the
then
unknown
Balian
family,
Sarkis
Khalfa,
was
also
an
architect
of
some
repute.
Khalfa,
or
kalfa
in
modern
Turkish,
means
“master
builder;
”
the
epithet
was
an
indication
of
the
profession
of
architect.
In
1727
Sarkis
Khalfa
built
a
church
and
is
mentioned
as
“palace
architect.
”
[96]
Most
probably
he
was
Melidon’s
deputy
whom
he
succeeded
after
the
latter’s
death.
The
family
rose
to
prominence
by
the
end
of
the
eighteenth
century
with
Krikor
Amira
Balian,
appointed
Imperial
Architect
by
Abdulhamit
I
(1774-1789).
Krikor,
with
his
brother
Senekrim,
his
son
Garabed,
and
three
grandsons,
all
architects,
formed
the
“Armenian
Ottoman
dynasty
of
royal
architects
who
were
to
be
responsible
for
as
many
acres
of
building
as
Sinan
had
been,
including
the
Dolmabahce,
Beylerbey
and
Ciragan
palaces.
”
[97]
After
the
construction
of
the
Nusretiye
(“Divine
Victory”)
mosque
in
1826,
“most
major
buildings
erected
for
the
sovereign
were
the
work
of
the
Balian
family
or
their
Armenian
assistants.
”
[98]
These
included
not
only
sumptuous
palaces
and
mosques,
but
also
barracks,
fire
towers,
industrial
factories
and
the
state
mint.
[99]
Garabed
Amira
Balian,
Krikor’s
son,
along
with
his
brother-in-law
Hovhannes
Amira
Serverian,
himself
a
royal
architect,
reportedly
built
some
180
buildings.
[100]
Neither
Garabed
nor
his
father
had
studied
abroad,
but
following
the
westernizing
pattern
his
three
sons,
Nigoghos,
Sarkis
and
Hagop,
were
sent
to
Paris
to
study
at
the
College
St.
Barbe.
All
three
studied
architecture,
and
continuing
in
the
family
tradition,
they
too
are
credited
with
the
construction
of
numerous
buildings.
[101]
Without
attempting
to
evaluate
the
artistic
contribution
of
this
family
to
Ottoman
architecture,
in
general,
and
to
the
beautification
of
the
capital,
in
particular,
the
following
quotation
from
an
authority
on
the
subject
should
be
sufficient
to
give
an
idea
concerning
their
influence:
“the
dynasty
(Balians)
introduced
European
fashion
and
a
flamboyance,
which
has
been
popular
ever
since.
”
[102]
In
addition
to
the
construction
of
buildings
for
the
state,
the
Balians
contributed
to
“the
European
appearance
of
the
new
neighborhoods”
of
Istanbul.
[103]
In
addition
to
the
professions,
Armenians
were,
of
course,
prominent
in
the
field
of
commerce
and
indeed
had
always
been
active
in
the
trade
of
the
Ottoman
Empire.
Of
the
great
merchants,
only
those
connected
with
the
palace
were
named
amira.
These
great
amira-merchants,
whom
the
Ottomans
called
bazirgân,
a
term
best
translated
as
“officially-appointed
purveyor,
”
[104]
provided
the
palace
with
such
necessities
as
çuha,
bez
(cotton
material),
tülbent
(muslin),
etc.
In
addition
to
their
primary
function
as
purveyors
of
the
palace,
many
bazirgâns
served
the
army,
assuming
responsibility
for
its
provisions.
Others
were
involved
in
general
trade.
As
early
as
the
1640s,
Armenian
merchants
occupied
the
position
of
bazirgânbaşi,
i.
e.
“chief
purveyor,
”
of
Sultan
Murad
IV’s
(1623-1640)
army
during
its
march
on
Baghdad
in
1638.
[105]
Many
of
these
merchants
controlled
a
single
trade
route
or
specialized
in
a
particular
commodity.
Throughout
the
1780s
and
1790s,
for
example,
Garabed
Manugian’s
fleet
dominated
shipping
between
Istanbul
and
Russia,
enabling
him
to
accumulate
a
great
fortune.
[106]
In
the
1750s,
Hovsep
Çelebi,
as
bazirgân,
monopolized
the
importation
of
watches
from
England,
controlling
their
sale
throughout
the
empire,
and
enriching
himself
in
the
process.
[107]
In
the
1760s,
three
amiras
are
reported
as
bazirgânbaşi
of
the
grand
vezir:
Boghos
Amira
(Aleksanian),
Ghazar
Amira
(Movsesian)
and
Aslan
Amira
(family
name
not
known).
[108]
After
the
grand
vezir’s
death,
they
all
fell;
Mardiros
Amira
Sakaian
along
with
his
associates
succeeded
them.
A
renowned
amira,
Mikayel
Pishmishian,
was
also
a
bazirgân,
specifically
ekmekçibaşi,
“chief
bread
purveyor,
”
for
the
government,
and
most
probably
for
the
army
as
well.
[109]
During
the
eighteenth
century
a
considerable
number
of
amiras
were
bazirgâns
but
after
the
turn
of
the
century
the
sources
are
silent
about
their
activities.
In
general,
the
bazirgân-amiras
are
a
much
more
limited
phenomenon
than
the
amiras
engaged
in
finance
and
industry.
Whatever
their
profession
or
field,
amiras
accumulated
great
wealth.
Apparently
the
Dadians
and
Balians
as
well
as
those
associated
with
them
were
salaried
state
employees.
An
Armenian
source
mentions
that
Garabed
Amira
Balian
would
receive
5,
000
Ottoman
gold
coins
as
a
present
or
reward
from
the
sultan
each
time
the
construction
of
a
building
was
completed.
[110]
According
to
the
same
source
he
had
built
180
buildings.
Assuming
that
a
few
dozen
of
these
buildings
were
for
private
parties,
such
as
houses
for
amiras
and
other
wealthy
individuals,
a
simple
arithmetic
computation
would
yield
a
huge
earned
income.
[111]
As
mentioned
earlier,
Simon
and
Hovhannes
Amira
Dadian
brothers
received
15,
000
and
10,
000
kuruş
respectively
from
Mahmud
II
as
bonuses
in
appreciation
for
their
inventions
and
skills.
Another
indication
that
the
Dadians
were
salaried
is
the
fact
that
in
1798
Selim
III
allocated
410
kuruş
for
each
of
the
three
young
sons
of
Dad
Arakel.
Moreover,
royal
architects
and
powder
makers
were
not
only
exempt
from
taxation
and
payment
of
duties,
but
received
lands
as
personal
gifts
from
the
various
sultans.
These
salaried
amiras
were
very
rich;
they
lived
in
luxury
and
abundance.
Hovhannes
Amira
Dadian,
for
one,
owned
three
houses:
in
Beşiktaş,
[112]
Azadli
and
Ay
Stefano.
Even
so,
their
wealth
was
not
on
the
level
of
that
of
a
sarraf-amira.
The
sarraf-amiras
took
advantage
of
the
opportunities
of
their
profession
and
enriched
themselves,
as
a
banker
would
do
in
any
country.
There
are
unfortunately
no
present
data
as
to
the
extent
of
their
wealth.
A
contemporary
western
observer
estimated
“the
utmost
extent
of
their
(the
sarrafs’)
fortunes
to
be
a
million
sterling.
”
[113]
The
joint
wealth
of
the
sarraf
and
bazirgân
Hagop
(or
Yagub)
Aģa
Hovhannesian
and
the
chief
[black?]
eunuch
Süleyman
was
estimated
to
have
reached
the
staggering
amount
of
45
million
kuruş
exclusive
of
jewelry
and
other
valuable
articles,
at
the
time
they
were
both
hanged
in
1752.
[114]
There
is,
however,
no
way
of
separating
the
share
of
the
Armenian
bazirgân
from
that
of
his
collaborator.
In
1828,
Harutiun
Amira
Bezdjian,
one
of
the
wealthiest
men
of
his
time,
is
reported
to
have
bought
the
pleasure
boat
of
a
European
traveler
for
350,
000
kuruş
with
“one
or
two
other
leading
[Armenian]
characters,
”
and
presented
it
to
Mahmud
II
as
a
gift.
[115]
In
the
same
year,
Harutiun
Amira
paid
for
half
of
the
expenditure
for
the
reconstruction
of
the
burnt-out
Patriarchal
building
and
its
adjacent
three
churches,
at
an
estimated
cost
of
as
much
as
three
million
kuruş.
[116]
These
wealthy
individuals
could
not
feel
secure
without
additional
guarantees.
The
government
granted
them
a
legal
framework
which
assured,
to
some
extent,
that
they
would
not
be
considered
simply
zimmi,
non-Muslim,
subjects.
Because
of
the
nature
of
the
profession
of
banking,
disputes
would
inevitably
arise
between
a
sarraf
and
his
debtor,
usually
a
mültezim
pasha.
The
sarraf
as
a
member
of
a
zimmi
millet
had
a
major
legal
handicap:
his
testimony
was
not
admissible
in
an
Islamic
court,
and
he
could,
therefore,
not
obtain
equitable
redress
in
an
ordinary
tribunal.
Furthermore,
the
sharia,
Islamic
canon
law,
considered
interest
on
money
loaned
as
illegal
and
usurious.
To
remedy
this
situation,
the
government
created
a
special
court
where
the
sarrafs’
lawsuits
could
be
tried
equitably.
It
is
not
clear
whether
this
special
court,
called
by
a
western
source
the
“council
of
the
mint,
”
[117]
was
connected
with
the
Ministry
of
Finance,
hazine-i
maliye,
or
the
Sultan’s
Privy
Purse,
hazine-i
hassa.
[118]
Whatever
the
jurisdictional
connections
of
this
tribunal,
the
fact
remains
that
the
sarrafs
were
granted
legal
rights
not
available
to
the
rest
of
the
non-Muslim
society,
and
were
“considered
privileged”
[119]
subjects
of
the
Sultan.
Even
so
this
extraordinary
and
favorable
legal
measure
guaranteed
the
security
of
neither
their
wealth
nor
their
person.
The
fact
remained
that
“eminent
posts
[were]
eminent
dangers
in
Turkey,
”
as
a
contemporary
western
observer
noted
succinctly.
[120]
Corruption
and
bribery
were
widespread
in
the
administration;
nothing
could
be
accomplished
without
bribery.
[121]
This
practice
was
not
limited
to
poorly-paid,
low
echelon
government
employees,
but
reached
the
highest
levels
of
the
ruling
class,
and
the
sultan
himself,
who
would
not
hesitate
to
confiscate
the
fortunes
of
his
wealthy
subjects
when
he
felt
need
for
money.
[122]
In
this
atmosphere
many
a
sarraf
lost
both
his
wealth
and
life.
To
some
extent
it
was
true
that
when
“a
sarraf
has
become
so
rich
as
to
make
him
worth
the
sacrifice...
[he]
is
hanged
and
decapitated,
his
property
seized,
and
his
family
reduced
to
utter
destitution.
”
[123]
Hagop
Hovhannesian’s
case
has
already
been
mentioned.
He
was
both
the
bazirgân
and
the
sarraf
of
the
grand
vezir.
[124]
In
1763,
Ghazaros
Amira
Movsesian,
bazirgân
of
the
Grand
Vezir
Ragib
Mehmet
Pasha,
was
imprisoned,
along
with
two
colleagues,
after
the
latter’s
death,
and
consequently
hanged.
[125]
In
1821,
Krikor
Amira
Tcharazian,
a
prominent
sarraf
in
Istanbul,
was
hanged
from
the
door
of
the
Valide
Han,
a
center
for
the
sarrafs.
[126]
In
general,
a
sarraf
was
imprisoned
or
killed
as
a
consequence
of
the
downfall
or
death
of
the
pasha
whose
political
patronage
he
enjoyed,
although
unlike
the
pasha,
the
Armenian
sarraf
might
occasionally
save
his
life
and
salvage
part
of
his
fortune
through
bribery
and
the
intervention
of
friends.
[127]
The
most
notorious
among
the
numerous
such
cases
of
sarraf
downfalls
was
that
of
the
Diuzians,
who,
as
we
have
noted,
held
the
twin
positions
of
director
of
the
mint
and
chief
goldsmith.
In
1819,
after
a
preliminary
investigation
of
their
accounts
and
activities
at
the
mint,
four
male
members
of
the
family
were
hanged,
while
the
others,
including
some
women,
were
banished
from
the
capital
to
Anatolian
cities,
and
their
extensive
properties
and
great
-fortune
confiscated.
This
was
such
a
significant
event
that
even
the
French
ambassador
reported
the
hangings
and
the
ensuing
confiscations
to
the
Foreign
Ministry
in
Paris.
[128]
There
is
extensive
literature
on
this
subject.
Suffice
it
to
state
that
the
accusation
of
flaws
in
the
accounts
by
the
government
was
not
without
any
foundation,
but
the
extreme
punishment
does
not
seem
to
have
been
warranted.
[129]
Another
striking
case
of
the
disgrace
and
impoverishment
of
an
Armenian
sarraf
was
that
of
Mgrditch
Amira
Djezayirlian,
who
was
the
sarraf
of
the
Grand
Vezir
Mustafa
Resid
Pasha.
A
short
time
after
Resid
Pasha’s
death
(7
January
1858),
Mgrditch
Amira’s
properties
and
wealth,
including
jewelry,
were
confiscated
(1859)
under
the
pretext
that
his
accounts
were
to
be
examined.
The
investigation
never
took
place,
he
was
left
totally
destitute
and
he
died
a
poor
man
two
years
later
(1
April
1861).
Such
misfortune
as
befell
Djazayirlian
Amira
was
not
as
frequent
and
ominous
as
the
change
of
grand
vezirs,
yet
it
did
happen
intermittently.
In
1832,
three
prominent
amiras,
Maksud
Amira
Sarimian,
the
brothers
Djanig
Amira
and
Khntir
Amira
Papazian,
faced
imminent
hanging
but
were
saved
thanks
to
the
intervention
of
well-placed
friends
in
the
government.
It
would
be
erroneous
to
deduce
or
assume
from
the
few
incidents
described
and
many
similar
ones
not
recounted
here
that
the
government
had
any
planned
policy
directed
against
the
Armenian
sarrafs.
The
imprisonments
and
executions
were
“normal”
consequence
of
Ottoman
political
vicissitudes.
If
the
pashas,
some
of
them
former
grand
vezirs,
could
be
hanged
or
decapitated,
the
Armenian
sarrafs,
as
zimmis,
would
be
just
as
liable
to
such
a
fate.
In
other
words,
there
is
no
evidence
that
throughout
this
period
the
Ottoman
government
pursued
any
deliberate
policy
inimical
to
sarrafs
in
general,
and
to
Armenian
sarrafs
and
wealthy
amiras,
in
particular.
On
the
contrary,
the
Armenian
sarrafs
were
so
well
integrated
into
the
Ottoman
system
that
they
enjoyed
the
confidence
and
trust
of
not
only
the
pashas
but
the
sultan
himself.
Maksud
Amira
Sarimian
is
reported
to
have
been
a
“special
scribe”
of
Mahmud
II
in
the
1820s.
[130]
Abdülmecid
dined
twice
at
Garabed
Çelebi
Diuzian’s
house
and
once
brought
with
him
the
valide
sultan,
i.
e.,
the
queen
mother.
[131]
He
also
visited
Garabed’s
nephew,
Mihran
Çelebi
Diuzian
at
the
latter’s
house.
[132]
Similarly
the
sultan
paid
many
visits
to
the
Dadians,
and
once
stayed
over
at
Boghos
Amira
Dadian’s
house
at
Ay
Stefano
for
four
days.
[133]
The
close
relations
that
developed
between
Mahmud
II
and
Harutiun
Amira
Bezdjian
remained
unparalleled.
Bezdjian
Amira,
known
also
as
Kazez
Artin,
became
a
companion,
confidant
and
a
counselor
of
the
sultan.
The
ties
of
friendship
were
so
close
that
many
anecdotes
were
told
about
them.
Kazez
Artin
was
a
frequent
visitor
at
the
palace.
When
he
fell
ill
the
sultan
visited
him
at
his
rather
modest
house
at
Yenikapu.
To
be
closer
to
the
palace,
he
was
moved
to
Ortaköy.
And
when
he
died
his
casket
was
put
in
a
boat,
according
to
the
wishes
of
the
sultan,
and
passed
by
the
palace,
so
Mahmud
could
bid
farewell
to
his
friend.
[134]
Two
incidents
are
sufficiently
indicative
of
Bezdjian’s
role
to
be
worth
presenting
here.
During
1829
there
was
a
shortage
of
food
in
the
capital
because
of
the
Russo-Turkish
war.
As
a
remedy
the
government
issued
a
decree
ordering
Armenians,
Greeks,
Jews
and
others
who
had
come
to
Constantinople
in
recent
years,
as
well
as
bachelors,
to
return
to
their
birthplaces.
This
decree
created
unrest
in
the
population.
Bezdjian
proposed,
instead,
the
removal
of
internal
customs
duties,
the
reduction
of
fees
on
travel
and
the
freeing
of
the
trade
of
wheat
and
other
staples
from
any
restrictions.
As
a
result,
the
capital
was
soon
flooded
with
wheat
and
other
foods.
[135]
At
the
end
of
the
war
a
new
difficulty
was
faced:
one
of
the
stipulations
of
the
treaty,
was
the
payment
of
heavy
war
indemnity.
As
the
Ottoman
state
treasury
was
empty,
Bezdjian
was
granted
permission
to
secure
the
amount
demanded
by
the
Russians
by
whatever
means
he
could.
In
a
matter
of
a
few
days
he
obtained
the
necessary
loans
from
the
European
and
local
merchants
in
Istanbul
and
presented
the
voucher
to
the
sultan.
[136]
Such
easy
access
to
and
close
contact
with
the
sultan,
at
a
time
when
he
was
still
“the
shadow
of
God
on
earth,
”
was
doubly
significant:
the
sultan,
by
communicating
with
these
zimmi
subjects,
was
giving
proof
of
his
open-mindedness;
the
Armenian
amiras,
having
such
closeness
with
the
ultimate
authority
in
the
Muslim
empire,
were
indicating
that
they
were
as
much
an
integral
part
of
the
Ottoman
ruling
class
as
any
other
elements.
The
Christian
Armenian
was
closer
to
the
sultan
and
his
entourage
than
most
Muslim
rayas
(subjects).
What
made
this
possible
was
the
role
reserved
to
the
Armenian
notables,
especially
the
sarrafs.
These
amira-sarrafs
were
capitalists
par
excellence:
as
capitalists
their
capital
was
essential
for
the
functioning
of
Ottoman
financial
structure.
In
the
iltizam
tax-farming
system
their
dual
role
of
sarraf,
as
banker
providing
capital
and
merchant
selling
commodities
given
in
lieu
of
cash,
was
indispensable.
The
iltizam
system
itself,
started
during
Mehmed
Fatih’s
period,
had
evolved
from
playing
a
small
and
limited
role
to
the
point
where
all
kinds
of
taxes,
not
just
’ushr,
the
tithe,
were
collected
in
this
way.
The
greater
the
importance
of
iltizam
in
Ottoman
financial
and
economic
structure,
the
more
critical
and
vital
was
the
position
of
the
sarrafs
in
the
entire
Ottoman
governmental
system.
In
spite
of
this,
the
sarrafs
were
not
perceived
positively.
They
were,
and
still
are,
depicted
as
usurers
who
charged
“des
taux
d’intérêt
extrèmement
élevés,
[137]
made
“enormous
but
unholy
gains
by
a
fictitious
raising
and
lowering
of
the
exchange,
by
elsewhere
unheard-of-usury,
”
[138]
and
who
were
“magnates
of
compradorial
capital.
”
[139]
According
to
a
European
contemporary
historian,
their
influence
was
so
corruptive
that
it
“grinds
the
peasantry,
puts
hatred
between
the
pashas
and
his
province,
degrades
the
character
of
the
public
service,
and
excludes
from
it
character,
honour
and
honesty.
”
[140]
Their
role
and
place
were
perceived
in
such
a
distorted
way
that
an
English
merchant
resident
in
Istanbul
argued
that
“one
of
the
two
reasons
for
Turkey’s
existence...
was
for
the
benefit
of
some
fifty
or
sixty
bankers
or
usurers,
and
some
thirty
or
forty
pashas,
who
make
a
fortune
out
of
its
spoils.
”
[141]
These
criticisms
and,
to
some
degree,
accusations
made
against
the
sarrafs
suggest
that
they
were
not
as
unselfish
and
disinterested
as
might
appear.
Contemporary
western
observers
expressed
indignation
at
the
usurious
rates
the
sarrafs
were
charging
for
their
loans,
but,
as
stated
earlier,
these
rates
were
neither
usurious
nor
outrageous.
Actually,
the
sarrafs
were
making
as
much
money
from
the
commercial
business
connected
to
tax
collecting
(buying
cheap
and
selling
high
the
agricultural
products
peasants
would
give
in
lieu
of
cash)
as
from
the
interest
on
loans.
But
Europeans
were
struck
by
the
high
rates
prevailing
in
Ottoman
financial
transactions.
And
since
they
had
“surplus
capital”
to
be
invested,
at
the
first
opportunity,
which
was
presented
after
the
Crimean
War
(1854-1856),
they
entered
into
Ottoman
finances.
[142]
The
rest
belongs
to
Ottoman
financial
history.
Unlike
contemporary
observers,
modern
students
of
the
subject
put
the
responsibility
equally
on
the
shoulders
of
the
sarraf
and
the
pasha.
A
modern
historian
found
collusion
between
the
two,
since
they
were
part
of
the
iltizam
system
and
benefited
equally
from
it.
They
were
exploiting
the
situation
illegally
to
their
personal
advantage.
[143]
Yet
the
contemporary
court
historian,
Cevdet
Pasha,
was
more
critical
of
the
mültezim
pashas
than
of
the
sarrafs.
He
called
the
mültezims
“that
group
of
bankrupt
and
rude
men,
who
went
to
the
provinces
and,
in
order
to
collect
higher
taxes
for
the
iltizam,
tormented
the
poor.
”
[144]
Even
the
harsh
western
contemporary
critic
of
sarrafs
came
to
the
conclusion
that
“the
cause
of
the
misgovernment
of
Turkey
is
to
be
found ...
in
the
power
of
the
pashas”
[145]
and
that
to
remedy
the
situation
“it
is
only
necessary
to
collect
the
revenue
without
the
intervention
of
the
pashas.
”
[146]
Whether
the
elimination
of
“the
intervention”
of
the
pashas
was
the
true
panacea
of
the
situation
or
not,
the
Armenian
sarrafs
certainly
had
their
share
of
responsibility
in
the
harsh
conditions
that
the
iltizam
tax-farming
system
had
created
for
the
Ottoman
taxpayer.
The
latter,
Muslim
and
zimmi,
suffered
from
the
multiplicity
and
weight
of
taxes
and
from
the
arbitrary
ways
in
which
they
were
administered.
[147]
The
Armenian
sarrafs
were,
in
the
final
analysis,
lending
money
to
a
state
which
was
financially
in
a
chronic
state
of
deficiency.
If
anything,
these
sarrafs
helped
the
fragile
Ottoman
financial
administration
keep
running
without
suffering
internal
shocks
or
break-ups,
and
held
outside
intervention
at
bay
for
more
time.
At
least
one
modern
Turkish
historian
has
acknowledged
the
salutary
role
of
the
sarrafs
during
this
crucial
time:
“the
roles
that
the
sarrafs
played
during
the
times
of
need
of
the
state
are
truly
great.
”
[148]
As
for
the
influence
of
the
Armenian
sarrafs,
according
to
one
contemporary
western
historian,
it
was
decisive
and
enormous,
for
“they
can
reduce
any
Turkish
governor
to
the
condition
of
a
private
individual.
”
[149]
This
assessment
of
their
economic
power
is
exaggerated,
if
not
misleading,
for
this
same
observer
noted
that
“the
bankers
have
no
power
of
their
own,
they
have
no
distinct
influence, ...
they
are
wholly
deprived
of
all
political
importance.
”
[150]
While
there
could
be
diversity
of
opinion,
if
not
controversy,
in
the
evaluation
of
the
function
and
role
of
sarraf-amiras,
the
assessment
of
technocrat-industrialist
and
architect
amiras
is
devoid
of
such
ambivalence
and
argumentation.
At
the
time
the
Dadians
and
their
associates
emerged
on
the
scene,
the
Ottoman
state,
under
Selim
III’s
guidance
and
instigation,
was
undertaking
tentative
and
limited
steps
to
introduce
machine
manufactured
goods
for
the
army.
These
efforts
were
intensified
under
Mahmud
II,
and
turned
into
an
ambitious
industrialization
program
during
Abdülmecid’s
reign.
More
than
anything
else,
the
government
needed
industrial
managers
with
technical
skills
who
could
implement
the
various
projects.
The
Dadians,
starting
with
Dad
Arakel
Amira,
demonstrated
unique
aptitude
and
skill
in
the
technical
field,
and
talent
in
industrial
and
skill
in
the
technical
field,
and
talent
in
industrial
management.
They
did
more
than
select
sites,
import
modern
machines,
or
operate
and
manage
the
various
manufacturing
plants.
They
invented
new
devices
and
machines,
and
adapted
others
from
European
models;
they
were
inventors
as
well
as
innovators.
The
Dadians
introduced
into
Ottoman
society,
in
general,
not
only
advanced
European
technological
methods,
but
western
mentality
and
way
of
thinking.
As
such,
they
were
westernizers
as
well.
As
a
class,
the
amiras,
whether
sarraf,
architect,
merchant-purveyor,
or
technocrat,
were
deeply
entrenched
in
the
Ottoman
governing
system
and
ruling
class.
They
enjoyed
Ottoman
governing
system
and
ruling
class.
They
enjoyed
privileges,
rights
and
status
which
were
bestowed
upon
only
those
who
belonged
to
the
governing
elite
of
Ottoman
society.
However
enviable
and
impressive
these
glamorous
trappings
were,
amiras
lacked
a
most
essential
ingredient
or
characteristic,
which
differentiated
them
from
the
rest
of
the
ruling
elite:
political
power.
Amiras
neither
held
political
offices
nor
exercised
any
truly
political
power
in
the
Ottoman
government;
they
could
not
affect
directly
the
latter’s
internal
or
external
policies.
Their
interests
lay
in
the
preservation
of
the
regime,
yet,
when
the
government
introduced
reform
measures
which
would
undermine
their
economic
interests
and
social
status
they
could
demonstrate
no
visible
opposition
and
acquiesced.
The
political
power
which
amiras
lacked
as
marginal
members
of
the
Ottoman
ruling
class,
they
found
ample
opportunity
and
almost
complete
freedom
to
exercise
in
the
Armenian
millet.
[1]
Among
many
Armenian
sources
the
following
are
cited:
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
61;
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
p.
19
passim;
Gabriel
Ayvazovski,
Patmutium
Osmanean
Petutean
[History
of
the
Ottoman
State],
2
vols.
(Venice,
1841),
2:
35;
H.
Injidjian,
Ashkharhagrutiun
Tchorits
Masants
Ashkharhi
[Universal
Geography],
5
vols.
(Venice,
1801-1806),
5:
121.
Among
Western
sources:
Ubicini,
Lettres,
2:
315;
MacFarlane,
Constantinople,
1:
112;
Urquhart,
Turkey,
pp.
108-112;
A.
Du
Velay,
Essai
sur
l'Histoire
Financière
de
la
Turquie
(Paris,
1903),
pp.
47,
53;
Adoiphus
Slade,
Records
of
Travels
in
Turkey,
Greece
(Philadelphia,
1833;
reprint
ed.,
London,
1854),
p.
434.
An
eyewitness
observed:
“All
the
pashas
in
the
interior
are
obliged
to
have
their
bankers,
and
these
for
the
most
part
are
Armenians
from
Constantinonle.
”
ABCFM,
Mission
to
the
Armenians,
Constantinople,
vol.
1
(1838-1844),
no.
144.
[2]
Ahmet
Cevdet,
Tarih-i
Cevdet,
12
vols.
(Istanbul,
1871-1880),
1:
159-163,
11:
45-46;
Armenian
trans.,
A.
KH.
Safrastian,
Turkakan
Aghbiurnere
Hayastani,
Hayeri
ev
Andrkovkasi
Mius
Joghovurdneri
Masin
[Turkish
Sources
About
Armenia,
Armenians
and
the
Other
People
of
Transcaucasia]
2
vols.
(Erevan,
1961-64),
1:
237-243,
300-302.
[3]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
79-3
S.
V.
“Hazine
Sarraflari.
”
[5]
Ibid.,
2:
57-53;
Mehmet
Genc,
Osmanli
Maliyesinde
Malikane
Sistemi
[The
Malikane
System
in
Ottoman
Finance],
ed.
Osman
Okyar,
Türkiye
Iktisat
Tarihi
Semineri
[Seminar
on
the
Economic
History
of
Turkey]
(Ankara,
1975),
pp.
232-235;
DuVelay,
Essai,
pp.
2-81.
[6]
For
a
cursory
study
of
the
history
of
the
iltizam
system
and
the
various
taxes
collected
see
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
2:
57-58
s.
v.
“Iltizamat.
”
[7]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
108.
[8]
Pakalin,
Devimleri,
2:
58.
[11]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
110.
[12]
Walsh,
Residence,
2:
430.
[13]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
110.
[14]
Walsh,
Residence,
2:
430.
[15]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
108.
[16]
White,
Three
Years
in
Constantinople,
2:
63.
[17]
The
following
quotation
is
typical
of
contemporary
Western
opinion
of
the
sarraf
s:
“...
the
native
saraff
[sic] ...
makes
his
enormous
but
unholy
gains
by
a
fictitious
raising
and
lowering
of
the
exchange,
by
elsewhere
unheard-of-usury,
and ...
by
‘sweating’
the
coins
which
pass
through
his
hands;
”
in
Farley,
The
Resources
of
Turkey,
p.
70.
[18]
Ami
Boue,
La
Turquie
d’Europe,
4
vols.
(Paris,
1840),
3:
124.
[19]
Ronald
C.
Jennings,
“Loans
and
Credit
in
Early
17th
Century
Ottoman
Judicial
Records,
”
Journal
of
the
Economic
and
Social
History
of
the
Orient
16
(1973):
184.
[21]
Ibid.,
p.
214.
The
going
rate
in
Western
Europe
on
governmental
bonds
was
five
or
six
percent
per
year.
See
Donald
C.
Blaisdell,
European
Financial
Control
of
the
Ottoman
Empire
(New
York,
1929),
p.
20.
[22]
Walsh,
Residence,
2:
430.
[23]
Ubicini,
Lettres,
2:
315.
[24]
Hovhannes
Sebastatsi,
Patmutiun
Sebastioy
[History
of
Sebastia],
ed.
B.
L.
Tchugaszian
(Erevan,
1974),
p.
115.
[25]
Toros
Azadian,
Akn
(Istanbul,
1956),
p.
87.
The
pasha,
after
his
elevation
to
grand
vezirate,
secretly
brought
the
Armenian
sarraf
’s
family
from
Akn
to
Istanbul,
settled
them
in
a
large
house
and
took
his
friend
for
a
casual
visit
there.
[26]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
109.
[27]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
793.
[28]
Endardsak
Oratsoyts,
1900,
p.
141;
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
p.
138.
[29]
Arshaloys
Araratean
(Izmir),
10
January
1847,
p.
3.
[30]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
2:
334,
s.
v.
“Kuyumicubaşi.
”
[31]
Haygag
Gosoian,
“Vaspurakani
Hay
Joghovrdakan
Mi
Kani
Dohmik
Arhestneri
Masin,
”
["About
A
Few
Native
Armenian
Crafts
of
the
Armenians
of
Vaspurakan"].
-
Varag
(Teaneck,
New
Jersey)
58
(July
1967):
24.
[32]
Küliçeci
is
a
Turkish
word
of
provincial
usage.
Neither
Ottoman
nor
modern
Turkish
dictionaries
mention
the
word.
The
closest
is
the
word
küliçe
meaning
“a
round
flat
cake
of
cast
metal,
wax,
etc.
”
in
Redhouse
Turkish-English
Lexicon
(Istanbul,
1921),
p.
1600.
[33]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
p.
123;
this
was
first
reported
by
Aram
Andonian
in
an
article
in
Loys,
1908,
no.
10.
[34]
See
article
by
Hovhannes
Der
Bedrosian,
“Hayeru
Sadare
Turk
Mshakoytin
ev
Tntesutean”
[“The
Contribution
of
Armenians
to
Turkish
Culture
and
Economy”],
Arev
(Cairo),
29
November
1976,
p.
3.
[35]
Encyclopedia
of
Islam,
2nd
ed.,
s.
v.
“Dar
al-Darb,
”
by
Halil
Inalcik
(hereafter
cited
as
EI2).
[36]
There
is
confusion
about
the
terms
emin
(a)
and
'amil
(b).
Uzunçarşili
and
Pakalin
consider
the
darphane
emini
the
official
who
was
appointed
yearly
and
whose
function
was
the
collection
of
revenues
from
the
mint.
(See
Ismail
Hakki
Uzunçarşili,
Osmanli
Devletinin
Saray
Teşkilati
[The
Palace
Organization
of
the
Ottoman
State]
(Ankara,
1945),
p.
386;
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
396.
)
For
Halil
Inalcik
(see
note
35
above),
it
was
the
'amil
who
occupied
that
position
and
fulfilled
the
function;
the
'amil
had
assistants,
called
emin
and
wekil.
Inalcik
states
that
the
operation
of
the
mint
was
in
the
hands
of
state-appointed
employees,
named
“emin
or
nazir,
who
had
its
[the
mint’s]
supervision.
”
While
the
first
two
consider
the
sahib-i
'ayar
(or
‘ayyar’
)
the
official
responsible
for
all
legal
and
technical
aspects
of
the
mint,
Inalcik
ascribes
to
him
the
position
of
director
too.
To
avoid
such
confusion
in
usage
of
the
two
terms,
the
Diuzians
are
called
directors
of
the
mint,
refraining
from
the
use
of
any
Ottoman
term.
(a)
emin:
Ott.
hist.
superintendent,
head
of
a
department,
p.
338;
(b)
'amil:
Arabic
hist.
governor,
high
administration
officer;
Ott.
hist.
intendent
of
finance,
collector
of
revenues,
p.
57
(in
New
Redhouse
Turkish-English
Dictionary,
Istanbul,
1974).
[37]
EI2,
s.
v.
“Dar
al-Darb,
”
by
Halil
Inalcik.
For
a
detailed
description
of
the
subdivisions
of
the
mint,
see
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
394-396;
Uzunçarşili,
Saray
Teşkilati,
pp.
384-386.
[38]
Asadur,
Polsoy
Hayere,
p.
71;
Mrmerian
adds
the
name
of
Rasdoģlu,
from
the
Rasdian
family,
without
further
identifying
him;
see
Mrmerian,
Masnakan
Patmutiun,
p.
66.
[39]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
p.
124;
Torkomian,
Eremia
Tchelepii,
1:
295.
[40]
Armenian
sources
claim
that
Bonfil,
the
Jewish
superintendent,
had
committed
fraud
and
was
to
be
hanged
had
not
Mikayel
Diuzian
intervened
and
saved
his
life.
Furthermore,
Mikayel
granted
Bonfil
a
lifelong
monthly
salary.
Apparently
another
Jew,
named
only
as
Balti,
tried
to
wrestle
the
position
but
was
unsuccessful.
See
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
pp.
124-125;
Menvishian,
Diuzeants,
pp.
14-16.
On
the
other
hand,
in
a
letter
dated
19
November
1762,
a
member
of
the
Mekhitarist
Congregation
in
Istanbul
wrote
to
his
superior
in
Venice
informing
him
of
the
fact
that
over
a
thousand
Jews
were
banished
from
the
capital
"for
their
treachery"
and
that
Mikayel
Düzoģlu
was
appointed
halçibaşi
(“chief
of
smelters
of
ores,
or
refiners
of
metals”)
by
the
king.
See
Archives,
Correspondence,
Mekhitarist
Convent,
Venice.
[41]
In
addition
to
the
section
for
the
goldsmiths,
the
mint
served
as
a
depository
for
the
keeping
of
the
jewelry
of
the
sultan
and
his
household,
the
jewelry
of
the
valide
sultan,
i.
e.
the
sultan’s
mother.
It
also
contained
a
treasury
for
the
payment
of
royal
expenditures,
a
bureau
for
securities
or
guarantees,
and
a
safe
for
royal
stamps.
See
“Kostandnupolsoy
Pogheranotse”
[“The
Mint
of
Constantinople”],
Bazmaveb,
1
December
1847,
p.
363.
[42]
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
p.
170.
[44]
Menevishian,
Diuzeants,
p.
37.
[45]
Menevishian,
Diuzeants,
p.
37.
[46]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
396.
[47]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
394.
[48]
Indjidjian,
Ashkharhagrutiun,
5:
121.
[49]
Mrmerian,
Masnakan
Patmutiun,
p.
51,
mentions
sahib-i
'ayar
Eremia
as
a
well-known
personality;
Hovhannes
Der
Bedrosian,
Hayeru
Sadare,
29
November
1976,
cites
Kakmadji
Kevork
Aga
and
Eghiazar
Aga
who
had
worked
in
the
mint
for
many
years.
[50]
Jan
Reychman
and
Ananiasz
Zajaczkowski,
Handbook
of
Ottoman
Turkish
Diplomatics
(The
Hague,
1968),
p.
29.
[51]
Cüneyt
Òlcer,
Sultan
Abdülmecid
Devri
Osmanli
Madeni
Paralari
[Ottoman
Coinage
during
the
Reign
of
Sultan
Abdülmecid
Han]
(Istanbul,
1978),
pp.
6-8;
“Pogheranotsi
Hin
Tetrakneru
Ardsanagrutiunnere
Norutiunner
Haytnetsin”
[“The
Old
Records
of
the
Mint
Disclosed
Novelties”],
Marmara
(Istanbul),
14
July
1978,
pp.
1
and
4.
I
thank
Mr.
Garo
Kürkman
of
Istanbul,
who
discovered
the
records
of
the
mint,
for
the
above
information.
[52]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
396.
[53]
P.
Ketchian,
Patmutiun
Hivandanotsin,
pp.
17-18.
[54]
Kehya
or
kâhya
means
“steward,
or
warden
of
a
trade
guild,
”
New
Redhouse,
p.
582.
[55]
Asadur,
Polsoy
Hayere,
p.
95.
[56]
Mrmerian,
Masnakan
Patmutiun,
p.
72.
[57]
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
206.
[59]
Ubicini,
Lettres,
2:
314.
[60]
Bernard
Lewis,
The
Emergence
of
Modern
Turkey,
2nd
ed.
(New
York,
1969),
p.
107.
[63]
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
p.
276;
Asadur,
Polsoy
Hayere,
p.
151,
note
1;
Ormanian,
Azgapatum,
3:
3734-3735.
[64]
Sources
do
not
give
a
date
for
the
dissolution
of
the
association.
[65]
Arshaloys
Araratean,
27
March
1853,
p.
1.
[66]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
2:
58.
[67]
Blaisdell,
European
Financial
Control,
p.
27
passim.
[68]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
23-25.
[69]
Edward
C.
Clark,
“The
Ottoman
Industrial
Revolution,
”
International
Journal
of
Middle
East
Studies,
5,
no.
1
(January
1974):
70.
[70]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
25-26.
[71]
Ibid.,
p.
28;
G.
Basmadjian,
“Dadian
Gerdastani
Djiughagrutiune”
[“The
Genealogy
of
the
Dadian
Dynasty”],
Banaser
(Paris),
1907,
p.
121.
[72]
Endardsak
Oratsoyts,
1932,
pp.
98-99.
[73]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
52-55.
[74]
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
pp.
264-265.
[75]
Prussian
engineers
tested
the
strength
of
the
gunpowder
manufactured
at
the
Azadli
mill,
compared
it
with
the
powder
made
in
England
and
they
found
the
two
of
equal
quality
and
standard.
See
Arshaloys
Araratean
(Izmir),
18
October
1841.
[76]
In
1846,
with
the
assistance
of
his
three
sons,
Hovhannes
Amira
tested
the
powder
manufactured
from
cotton
at
the
presence
of
Sultan
Abdülmecid,
with
successful
results.
See
Hayastan
(Constantinople),
30
November
1846.
[77]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
63-73;
Alboyadjian,
Les
Dadian,
pp.
79-80
and
100-102.
[78]
Arshaloys
Araratean,
1847,
no.
280.
[79]
Clark,
Industrial
Revolution,
p.
71.
[81]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
123-127.
[83]
Torkomian,
Eremia
Tchelepii,
1:
400.
[84]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
p.
47.
[85]
Walsh.
Residence,
2:
432.
[86]
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
p.
65.
[87]
Clark,
Industrial
Revolution,
p.
68.
[88]
The
Times
(London),
23
January
1850,
p.
6,
reported
in
Clark,
Industrial
Revolution,
p.
73.
[89]
Clark,
Industrial
Revolution,
p.
74;
Cyrus
Hamlin,
Among
the
Turks
(London,
1878),
pp.
57-60.
[90]
Ibid.,
pp.
73-74.
To
cite
a
few
of
the
accident
in
1848
the
kücük
Çekmece
powder
works
blew
up;
in
1855
an
earthquake
destroyed
the
silk
mill
at
Bursa;
due
to
lack
of
access
roads
and
mining
equipment
the
exploitation
of
coal
and
iron-ore
deposits
lagged,
which
in
turn
affected
delivery
of
iron
plows
to
the
model
farm,
etc.
[93]
Charles
Issawi,
ed.,
The
Economic
History
of
the
Middle
East,
1800-1914
(Chicago,
1966),
p.
47.
[94]
Indjidjian,
Ashkharhagrutiun,
5:
131;
Torkomian,
Eremia
Tchelepii,
1:
213.
[95]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
p.
160,
states
that
Bali’s
son
was
Minas
who
served
Sultan
Ahmed
III
(1703-1730)
and
Mahmud
I
(1730-1754)
and
died
in
1703
(?).
The
date
of
death
is
most
probably
misprinted
and
should
read
1730.
Torkomian,
on
the
other
hand,
cites
Minas
as
the
architect
of
the
church
built
in
1804,
based
upon
the
account
of
the
contemporary
chronicler.
See
Torkomian,
Eremia
Tchelepii,
1:
213-214
[96]
Asadur,
Polsoy
Hayere,
p.
61.
[97]
Godfrey
Goodwin,
A
History
of
Ottoman
Architecture
(Baltimore,
1971),
p.
417.
[100]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
2:
43.
[101]
For
a
listing
of
the
buildings
Sarkis
and
Nigoghos
Balian
(Hagop
died
relatively
young)
constructed,
see
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
on.
138-139.
[102]
Goodwin,
Ottoman
Architecture,
p.
419.
For
further
evaluation
of
their
work,
see
also
pp.
398-399
and
417-426.
[104]
According
to
Pakalin,
the
bazirģâns
were
Christian
merchants,
who
were
called
also
çorbaci
and
çelebi.
The
term
was
used
synonymously
for
big
merchant,
ehl-i
ticaret,
i.
e.,
people
of
commerce,
and
merchant
whose
occupation
was
commerce
or
money
lending,
sarraflik.
See
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
183,
s.
v.
“bazirģân”
and
“bazirģânbaģşi.
”
[105]
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
272.
[106]
Mrmerian,
Masnakan,
p.
71.
[107]
Der
Bedrosian,
Hayeru
Sadare,
6
November
1976,
p.
3.
[108]
Mrmerian,
Masnakan
Patmutiun,
p.
65.
[109]
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
178.
[110]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
2:
43.
[111]
This
income
could
fluctuate
between
500,
000
(for
100
buildings)
and
900,
000
gold
coins,
assuming
that
the
5,
000
coins
were
the
normal
fee.
[112]
It
was
at
this
house
in
Beşiktaş
that,
in
1856,
Hovhannes
Amira
received
Marechal
Pelissie,
the
commander
of
Allied
Forces
during
the
Crimean
war,
whom
he
had
known
when
he
was
in
France.
Masis
(Constantinople),
1856,
no.
232,
reported
in
Boghosian,
Dadian
Gerdastane,
pp.
77-78;
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
pp.
600-601.
[113]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
109.
[114]
J.
M.
Jouannin
and
Jules
Van-Gauer,
Turquie
(Paris,
1850),
p.
343,
reported
in
Ormanian,
Azgapatum,
p.
2979.
[115]
MacFarlane,
Constantinople,
1:
491.
[116]
Endardsak
Oratsoyts,
1901,
p.
191.
[117]
Ubicini,
Lettres,
2:
314.
[118]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
793.
[120]
MacFarlane,
Constantinople,
1:
113
[121]
Stanley
Lane-Poole,
Preface
to
The
People
of
Turkey,
by
John
Elijah
Blunt,
2
vols.
(London,
1878),
p.
xvi.
A
contemporary
Turkish
humorist
put
it
very
aptly:
“iceri
girdim,
selam
verdim,
rüsvet
degil
dir
degi
almadilar.
”
Trans.
“I
entered
in
[the
office],
and
gave
them
my
greetings,
but
as
it
was
not
a
bribery
they
did
not
take
it.
”
[122]
Stanford
Shaw,
History
of
the
Ottoman
Empire
and
Modern
Turkey,
2
vols.
(Cambridge,
Mass.,
1976),
1:
265.
[123]
Walsh,
Residence,
2:
431.
To
cite
the
case
of
a
non-Armenian,
Shapdji,
a
wealthy
Jew
who
was
so
charitable
that
he
was
called
“father
of
the
poor,
”
was
killed
on
a
minor
pretext
and
his
fortune
confiscated.
MacFarlane,
Constantinople,
2:
147-150
[124]
Torkomian,
Eremia
Tchelepii,
2:
612,
3:
279.
[125]
Ibid.,
2:
612;
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
285.
These
sources
mention
the
names
of
three
different
individuals.
The
confusion
is
due
to
the
fact
that
amira
s
are
mentioned
in
their
first
names,
as
was
the
custom
in
the
nineteenth
century.
[126]
A.
Berberian,
Patmutiun,
pp.
175
and
465.
[127]
Mrmerian,
Masnakan
Patmutiun,
p.
65.
[128]
Archives
des
Affaires
Etrangères,
Paris,
Correspondence
Diplomatique,
Turquie,
vol.
232
(July
1819
-
December
1820),
p.
108.
[129]
To
mention
a
few
sources
on
the
subject:
Arsen
Pakraduni,
Azgabanutiun
ev
Patmutiun
Nshanavor
Antsits
Aznuazarm
Tann
Diuzeants
[Genealogy
and
History
of
Major
Events
of
the
Noble
Diuzian
Dynasty]
(1856,
MS,
Mekhitarist
Library,
Venice);
MacFarlane,
Constantinople,
2:
143-144;
Menevishian,
Diuzeants,
pp.
28-33;
Ayvazovski,
Osmanean
Petutean,
2:
519;
Ormanian,
Azgapatum,
2:
3452-3455.
According
to
the
sources
cited,
the
culprit
was
Halet
Efendi
who,
as
Grand
Vezir,
exerted
great
influence
over
Mahmud
II,
as
well
as
Halet’s
Jewish
sarraf
Yehazkel
(see
M.
Franco,
Essai
sur
l’Histoire
des
Israelites
de
l'Empire
Ottoman
(Paris,
1897),
p.
133)
whom
Armenian
sources
call
Khesgel.
Halet
replaced
the
’amil
of
the
mint,
Abdülrahman
Bey,
friendly
with
the
Diuzians
with
his
own
collaborator
Hayrullah
Efendi.
The
latter
investigated
the
accounts
of
the
mint
and
found
discrepancies.
The
Diuzians
had
made
many
loans;
moreover,
they
had
lavishly
spent
money
frcm
the
mint.
They
were
given
no
opportunity
to
collect
the
loans
they
had
made,
nor
to
get
loans
from
friends
to
repay
the
money
missing
in
the
accounts;
they
were
forced
to
sign
confessions
of
embezzlement
and
were
immediately
hanged.
Eventually
Halet
Efendi
was
removed
from
office
and
beheaded.
His
Jewish
sarraf
was
saved
from
certain
death
thanks
to
the
intercession
of
Bezdjian
Amira.
[130]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
p.
28.
[131]
Menevishian,
Diuzeants,
p.
41.
[132]
Pakraduni,
Azgapanutiun
Diuzeants,
p.
2.
[133]
A.
Ketchian,
Akn,
p.
138.
[134]
Toros
Azadian,
Hariurameay
Hobelean
Bezdjian
Mayr
Varjarani,
Kum
Kapu,
1830-1930
[Centenary
of
the
Bezdjian
School,
Kum
Kapu,
1830-1930]
(Constantinople,
1930),
pp.
22-23;
S.
Papazian,
Kensagrutiun,
p.
65;
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
pp.
8-9.
[135]
Zartarian,
Hishatakaran,
pp.
20-21.
[136]
Ibid.,
p.
23.
Alexander
W.
Hidden,
The
Ottoman
Dynasty
(New
York,
1912),
pp.
304-305.
[137]
Du
Velay,
Essai,
p.
52.
[138]
N.
W.
Senior,
A
Journal
Kept
in
Turkey
and
Greece,
1857-58
(London,
1859),
p.
85.
[139]
Ghazarian,
Arevmtahayeri,
p.
396.
[140]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
112.
[141]
Senior,
Journal,
p.
84.
[142]
Blaisdell,
European
Financial
Control,
p.
23.
[144]
Cevdet,
Tarih,
6:
235-238;
Safrastian,
Turkakan
Aghbyurnere,
1:
27-279.
[145]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
117.
[147]
Du
Velay,
Essai,
pp.
59-108,
about
the
condition
of
the
Ottoman
taxpayer.
[148]
Pakalin,
Deyimleri,
1:
792.
[149]
Urquhart,
Turkey,
p.
108.